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Abstract- Matching is of one of the essential problems in computer science and finding the stable 
matching is often difficult. For example, matching the medical students to hospitals where each 
student has its own preferences as well as each hospital has its own category in order to select 
the interns it can be difficult. Therefore there are many constraints that one needs to look at 
before solving matching problems. There are some algorithms which ensure that is possible to 
find a stable matching solution of this type of problems if any exists. In this paper, the instability 
of stable matching algorithm in dynamic environment has been demonstrated. The approach 
consists in mapping a specific stable matching problem (stable marriage problem) which has a 
stable solution into a dynamic environment where the instability is shown by using dynamic trust 
model.    
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Abstract-
 
Matching   is   of  one  of  the  essential   problems  in
 
computer science and finding the stable matching is often 
difficult. For example, matching the medical students to 
hospitals where each student has its own preferences as well 
as each hospital has its own category in
 
order to select the 
interns it can be difficult. Therefore there are many constraints 
that one needs to look at before solving matching problems. 
There are some algorithms which ensure that is possible to 
find a stable matching solution of this type of problems if any 
exists. In this paper, the instability of stable matching algorithm 
in dynamic environment has been demonstrated. The 
approach consists in mapping a specific stable matching 
problem (stable marriage problem) which has a stable solution 
into a dynamic environment where the instability is shown by 
using dynamic trust model.
 
 
 
I.
 
Introduction
 
iven two different sets, the elements of one set 
mapped to the elements of another set is known 
as matching. A matching is called stable if there 
is no
 
pair (A, B) such that both are better matched than 
their current matched element. If there is an element A 
of one set which desires another element B of the 
second set over its current matched and the element B 
as well desires A over its current
 
matched element, this 
matching is known as not stable matching. 
 
A stable matching problem consists of finding a 
stable matching given two evenly sized
 
sets of elements 
as well as an ordering of the elements’ preferences. The
 
solution obtained from this type of algorithms guarantee 
that the assigned pairs of elements won’t prefer any 
other partners to their current partners.  
There are also some stable matching 
algorithms which allow
 
ties in their preference lists. The 
absence of an unmatched pairs of elements where 
those
 
elements prefers each other to its current 
matched element is required for the stability of the 
solution of this type of algorithms.
 
There are many variants of stable matching problems:
 
•
 
Stable marriage problem [7]:
 
This problem consists 
on
 
finding a stable matching of n couples. There will 
a list of n men with their preferred list of n women, a 
list of n women with their preferred list of n men. The 
preference list will contain the ranking of the 
individuals according to their choices from high to 
low. A man will propose a woman, according to his 
preference list and if the woman is available, then it 
will be paired with that man and the output will be a 
certain list containing the matched couple. 
• Stable roommates problem [3] [8]: This problem is 
very similar to stable marriage problem, however it 
requires to have a single set with n cardinality, with 
each member having preferences respect the rest 
of the members. The stable matching is considered 
as the initial set partitioned into n/2 pairs such that 
there is no two unmatched members that both of 
them prefer each other instead of their current 
partners. There is a possibility of a stable matching 
does not exist. 
• Assignment problem [9]: The problem consists in 
finding the best possible assignment to a set of jobs 
to complete for a set of persons, where the jobs are 
ranked by total scores or by the ratings of the 
employees assigned to those jobs. 
• College admission problem [5]:  This problem is also 
known as hospital/residents problem and it also 
very similar to stable marriage problem. The main 
difference between these two problems are that in 
the hospital/resident problem one hospital can take 
more than one residents where as in stable 
marriage problem a man take have only one 
woman. That is, here one-to-many relationship is 
permitted. 
• Hospitals/residents problem with couples [6]: This 
problem is a variation of the previous problem 
adding some other constraints. Here, the residents 
which are couples must be mapped to the same 
hospital. The members of a couple will have their 
own list of preferences in order to rank the hospitals 
and the joint preference list will be consider for 
matching. 
Researchers have been using trust theories to 
construct different type of trust models to overcome 
unacceptable behaviors. Trust issues have become 
more suitable nowadays to prove the efficiency of 
certain algorithmic issues. These trust models have 
been used to model various aspects such as network 
security approaches, user authorization [17] or firewall 
access control measurements. The trust and reputation 
of the models are vital to ensure a correct behavior 
G 
  
  
   
29
  
 
(
)
G
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
V
III
 I
ss
ue
 I
II 
V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
Y
e
a
r
20
18
© 2018   Global Journals 
Keywords: stable matching, dynamic trust model, stable 
marriage problem, trust management, algorithm 
instability.
Author α σ: BUET, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, 
Dhaka, Bangladesh. e-mails: rejwana.haque@gmail.com,
sifat_jahan7@gmail.com
among the agents involved. Consider the example of 
real estate consultancy site, the required elements are 
finding a suitable plot are, best interior facilities, etc., 
where the integrity trust is vital and is based on elements 
such as the existence of  fraudulent charges on 
customers. In this particular context, an agency with 
lowest integrity trust will be preferred where having 
better deals are more considered than the risks of being 
fraud. There are many types of trust models: 
• McKnights Trust Model [13]: The social trust model 
is described in this computation model. This model 
defines five types of trust: trusting belief (faith in 
truster to provide benefices on trustee), trusting 
behavior (trusts action to expose a risk or increase 
trust), institution based trust, trusting intention (trust 
decision influencing trust behavior), and disposition 
to trust (influence institution-based trust, trust 
intention and trusting belief). The institution-based 
trust is subdivided to: 
− Structural pledge: The trust of a successful outcome 
having an organized structures. This is more relied 
on trusting intention and not to trusting belief. 
− Situational normality: The trust of a successful 
outcome having a properly ordered environments. 
Both trusting intention and belief influence situation 
normality. 
• Computational Trust Models [11]: The context and 
situation trust is described in this type of models 
which are involving dynamic environment. 
Applications such as trust on social networking sites 
or access control in P2P networks [10] are based on 
this type of modeling.  
Matching is present in all aspects of human life 
such as the selection of education institutions, the 
selection of a country for higher education or the 
selection of a new residency and finding a stable 
matching of these problems are crucial. Researchers 
have been successfully demonstrated that is possible to 
find a solution of these type of problems having an 
ordered list of preferences. Even though these 
algorithms are well structured and strongly illustrated, in 
practice these are not widely studied. The human mind 
is still an immense mystery and in any time human 
perception can be changed, that is, their preferences 
can be changed suddenly which is the main motivation 
of this research paper. These type of algorithms are 
based on the preferences of people or institutions (e.g. 
there is a human mind behind it) and such preferences 
can be changed in any time so how the stability of the 
algorithms can be defined on such situations. The same 
situation can be modeled in the network flow of a packet 
where the paths that the packet can flow may varies 
given the environment constraints. In this paper the 
stable marriage problem has been chosen to be 
modeled in a dynamic environment using computational 
trust models (specifically, dynamic trust model) and find 
the instability of this algorithm.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section I 
contains the introduction of paper emphasizing on this 
motivation of the research work and section II describes 
and reviews the related works. In section III the research 
proposal is explained in detail, section IV contains the 
experimental results explained with example in detail. 
The section V and VI contains possible future directions 
and limitations of this research study respectively. The 
paper concluded with conclusion in section VII. 
II. Literature Review 
In order to proceed with the proposed research 
study understanding the entire concept of stable 
marriage problem and how the dynamic trust model 
works is essential. The following papers are the main 
basis of this study: 
• Gale-Shapley Algorithm [5] [16]: The stable 
marriage problem is first studied by Gale and 
Shapley in the paper [5]. They studied marriage 
problem and defined an algorithm to solve it with a 
stable matching solution, as well as they prove that 
the stable matching is possible. The main purpose 
is to match the men with women (oneto-one 
relationship) in such a way so that no unmatched 
couple prefers each other instead of their current 
partner. By solving this problem, this authors 
extended their solution to college admission 
problem. 
•
  computational
 
model has been proposed for 
providing security in
 
communication of multi-agent 
systems. In this research
 
study the authors uses 
different trust calculations on the agents to find the 
existence of any malicious behavior among those 
and proposed a comprehensive model for
 
such 
trust calculations and a load balancing algorithm to
 possible the cope up with malicious agents 
behaviors at
 
the same time providing an efficient 
workload distribution to the agents.  
Very few works have been done combining 
stable matching
 
with trust models. However,
 
there are 
some works which are concerned with the stability of 
stable matching. The most
 
important are:
 •
 
In this paper [1], the researchers demonstrate that 
the
 
stability of stable matchings in the social context 
make a huge difference.
 
They study the stable 
matching problems
 
where players are entrenched in 
the social context, and
 
relation such as friendship or 
altruism may impact in their decisions. Basically, the 
care towards friends among
 
players plays a vital 
difference in the quality of stable
 
matching 
solutions.
 •
 
In paper [4], they propose a stable matching 
algorithm which can provide an almost stable 
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Secured Trust [2]: In this paper a dynamic trust 
matching by knowing only its neighborhood. They 
show there results by applying the proposed 
algorithm in bicolored graphs to find maximum-
weight matching and for the size of stable matching 
a centralized randomized constant-time 
approximation scheme is used. 
• The preferences of the participants are exposed in 
the existing stable matching algorithms which 
violates their privacy as well as it creates a 
possibility of manipulation of the algorithm. Having 
in mind all this concern a private stable matching 
algorithm is proposed in [6] which guarantees to 
provide a stable solution. 
• The complexity of stable matching problems has 
been studied in [14]. In this paper, the roommate 
problem and residents problem with couples have 
been studied and demonstrated the NP-
completeness of these problems if ties are allowed 
or not. They show that the roommate problem is NP-
complete if ties are allowed and residents problem 
with couples is NP-complete with or without ties. 
• The two-side matching problems are addressed in 
[15], mainly the market failures associated with the 
instability of the stable matching has been studied. 
Allowing random selection of pairs will converge to 
stable matching with probability one is shown in this 
research. 
III. Methodology 
The proposed approach is proving the 
instability of stable matching solution of the stable 
marriage problem using dynamic trust model. The 
dynamic model is based on specific trust calculations, 
such as historic trust or expected trust; the paper [2] 
has been studied for the following measurements and to 
implement stable marriage solution the paper [5] has 
been focused. Basically, the trust models have been 
used to model the human behavior computationally.  
The following steps have been followed to prove 
the instability of the stable matching: 
• Evaluate current satisfaction for current transaction. 
Satisfaction means the degree of comfort the 
couple has together. Current satisfaction represents the 
satisfaction for the most recent transaction. 
As in real life the behavior of a person cannot 
be pre
 
assumed and human behavior can changed time 
to time,
 
so for our implementation we took random value 
form 0
 
to 1 of evaluating current satisfaction.
 
•
 
Calculate Direct trust up to current transaction 
satisfaction.
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
the weight changes changes based on the 
accumulated deviation 
 
 
 
 
 
Here c is constant factor which controls to what 
extent
 
participants will react to recent errors
The recent
 
value of satisfaction is given more 
significance than
 
past trusts. So, if we increase the value 
of c then we
 
give more significance to the recent 
deviation than the
 
accumulated deviation and vice 
versa. Again, we can see
 
that as recent error 
 
increases so does which
 
means that recent 
satisfaction is given higher weight than
 
accumulated 
satisfaction.
 
•
 
Calculate Recent trust. Recent trust reflects only the
 
recent behavior. The recent trust between 
participants is calculated as follows:
 
 
 
•
 
Calculate Historical trust up to current time interval.
 
Historical trust means past experience of the 
participants
 
to one another. As in real life human forget 
past so for
 
calculating historical trust forgetting factor is 
introduced.
 
 
 
 
 
•
 
Calculate Expected trust based on Recent trust and 
Historical
 
Trust.
 
Expected trust reflects expected behavior of the 
couple to
 
one another. In real life it is deduced from 
both recent and
 
historical trust. In other words, we are 
combining both recent behavior and historical behavior 
to get a prediction
 
of the future behavior.
 
 
 
 
Initially 
 
as expectation remains 
zero before
 
any transaction. We calculate the expected 
trust of each
 
pair of participants for each time interval 
and generated
 
trust matrix at time interval t. 
•
 
Update preference matrix based on Expected trust.
 
Based on the Expected trust of the participants 
the
 
preference matrix for stable matching is generated. 
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Direct trust keeps record of the satisfaction level 
of all the transaction the couple have together. Initial 
Satcur =

0 if the transaction is fully unsatisfactory
1 if the transaction is fully satisfactory
ε(0, 1) otherwise
value direct trust If the amount of 
satisfaction the couple p and q have together at nth
transaction in tth time interval, then direct trust is 
calculated as follows:
DT 00 (p, q) = 0.
DT tn(p, q) = α× Satcur + (1− α)DT t(n−1)(p, q)
α = threshold+ c× δ
t
n(p, q)
1 + ξtn(p, q)
ξtn−1(p, q).
α
ξtn(p, q) = c× δtn(p, q) + (1− c)× ξtn−1(p, q)
δtn(p, q)
(δtn(p, q))
(δtn(p, q))
(δtn(p, q))
α
RT tn(p, q) = DT
t
n(p, q)
HT tn(p, q) =
ρ×HT tn−1(p, q) +RT tn−1(p, q)
2
Etn(p, q) = ηRT
t
n(p, q) + (1− η)HT tn(p, q)
Etn(p, q) = 0
(1)
The satisfaction of participant’s transaction has 
not been selected randomly, instead a defined range 
has been used.
IV. Experimental Results 
The experimental results show the result of 
matching N men with N women where N=5 with time 
interval 3. The step-wise expected trust and preference 
calculation has been shown in the below tables. 
Table I: Expected Trust 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I shows the expected
 
trust of the 
participants of 3 time
 
intervals. means 
Expected Trust of Participant i to
 
Participant at time 
interval t after n transaction and vice versa.  
Based on the expected trust preference of male 
and female
 
is calculated for different time interval.
 
Table II:
 
Preference of Female
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table II shows the preference of Female at 
different time
 
intervals 
 
preference of 
Female at time
 
interval 
Table III:
 
Preference of Male
 
Table III shows the preference of Male at 
different time intervals 
 
preference of 
 
Male at time interval
After
 
1st interval stable matching is done based 
on the
 
preference list of male and female after 1st time 
interval.
 
Table
 
IV: Preference of Female after 1st time interval
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table
 
VI: Stable matching after 1st time interval
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Time interval: 2
0.9088 0.5559 0.5107 0.5379 0.9076
0.4082 0.9171 0.4612 0.4713 0.9232
0.4700 0.5257 0.9057 0.6220 0.8990
0.4310 0.6355 0.4956 0.8979 0.8965
0.9257 0.8871 0.8965 0.9236 0.8963
Time interval: 3
0.9553 0.4056 0.5466 0.5289 0.9458
0.5846 0.9462 0.5328 0.3969 0.9425
0.5337 0.5342 0.9534 0.4396 0.9300
0.5491 0.4302 0.5882 0.9168 0.9362
0.9465 0.9270 0.9363 0.9309 0.9239
V al(i, j, t)
j
Time interval: 1
5 1 2 4 3
5 2 4 3 1
3 5 1 4 2
5 4 3 1 2
3 2 5 4 1
Time interval: 2
5 1 3 4 2
2 5 4 1 3
3 5 1 4 2
5 4 3 1 2
2 1 3 4 5
Time interval: 3
1 5 2 4 3
2 5 3 4 1
3 5 4 1 2
5 4 1 3 2
1 2 4 3 5
V al(i, j, t) jth ith
t.
Time interval: 1
5 1 4 3 2
5 2 4 1 3
3 5 4 2 1
5 4 2 3 1
1 4 2 5 3
Time interval: 2
1 5 2 4 3
5 2 4 3 1
3 5 4 2 1
4 5 2 3 1
1 4 3 5 2
Time interval: 3
1 5 3 4 2
2 5 1 3 4
3 5 2 1 4
5 4 3 1 2
1 3 4 2 5
V al(i, j, t) jth ith
t.
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
5 1 3 4 2
2 5 4 1 3
3 5 1 4 2
5 4 3 1 2
2 1 3 4 5
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1 5 2 4 3
5 2 4 3 1
3 5 4 2 1
4 5 2 3 1
1 4 3 5 2
Female Male
5 1
1 2
3 3
4 4
2 5
Table V: Preference of Male after 1st time interval 
Female Male
We calculated the stable matching of N = 5 
participants
 
at T = 3
 
different time interval. The results 
are different for
 
different time interval. Which means 
Stable matching at time
 
T = t will be unstable at time T
 
= t + 1. 
Table IX:
 
Stable matching
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IX shows Stable matching in different time interval.
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Table VII: Female Preference list after the 2nd time 
interval
Table VIII: Male Preference list after the 2nd time interval
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1 5 2 4 3
2 5 3 4 1
3 5 4 1 2
5 4 1 3 2
1 2 4 3 5
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1 5 3 4 2
2 5 1 3 4
3 5 2 1 4
5 4 3 1 2
1 3 4 2 5
Time interval: 1
1 1
2 3
3 2
4 4
5 5
Time interval: 2
1 5
2 1
3 3
4 4
5 2
Time interval: 3
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 5
5 4
Fig.1: Unstable couples created in different time 
intervals
Figure 1 shows the number of unstable couples 
created with different time intervals, where the number of 
participants is 50 and time interval of 30 have been 
considered. Using dynamic trust modeling we have 
proved the instability of stable matching algorithm which 
is clearly shown in above graph.
V. Limitations
The proposed approach has some limitations 
as it takes in consideration some specific constraints. 
The approach only takes N men and N women, whereas 
the number of men and women may vary time to time. 
The time decay model has not been considered for the 
implementation which imposes one of the boundaries of 
this approach and lastly only direct experience has been 
considered.
VI. Future Scope
In future, this research can be further expanded 
to different stable matching problems such as 
assignment problem or college admission problem. In 
the proposed approach only one-to-one mapping has 
been considered, thus many-to-one or many-to-many 
problems can also be addressed in future. Also, the 
limitation can be overcome by considering different trust 
models and including time decay model.
VII. Conclusion
There are many algorithms that states that 
matching problems can find a stable solution. However, 
the stability of these solution have not studied so far. In 
this paper, we proposed a novel approach to identify the 
instability of stable matching solutions given by those 
algorithms. Mainly, stable marriage problem has been 
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considered to be mapped in a dynamic environment 
where human behavior is modeled by using trust
models.
Even though the instability of stable matching 
has been proved, there are some limitations in this 
approach which the researchers have planned to 
overcome in future by integrating different trust 
calculations as well as by integrating time decay model.
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